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ABSTRACT
      This paper presents an overview of different 
concepts regarding covert channels. It discusses 
the various classifications and the detailing of 
various fields used to manipulate for the covert 
channel execution. Different evaluation 
criteria’s are presented for measuring the 
strength of covert channels. The defenses and 
prevention schemes for this covert channel will 
also be discussed. This paper also discuss about 
an advanced timing channel i.e. Temperature 
Based Covert Channel.
Keywords: Covert Channel, Storage Channel, 
Timing Channels, Temperature based Covert 
Channel
1. Introduction
Often it is thought that encryption is 
sufficient to secure communication. However, 
encryption only prevents unauthorized parties 
from decoding the communication. In many 
cases the mere existence of communication or 
changes in communication patterns, such as an 
increased message frequency, are enough to 
raise suspicion and reveal the onset of events. 
Covert channels attempt to hide the very 
existence of communication. Typically, they use 
means of communication not normally intended 
to be used. Even the most securely designed 
computer systems may inadvertently contain
covert (communication) channels between 
specific users/processes of different security 
levels. Several definitions for covert channels 
have been proposed depending on the context, 
such as the following:
 According to Lampson [1], a
communication channel is covert if it is 
neither designed nor intended to transfer 
information at all.
 According to Schaefer [2], A 
communication channel is covert (e.g., 
indirect) if it is based on "transmission by 
storage into variables that describe resource 
states.”
 According to Kemmerer [3], Covert 
channels are those that "use entities not 
normally viewed as data objects to transfer 
information from one subject to another."
Indeed any of these definitions is correct in a 
particular situation, but together they help to 
understand the concept of covert channels. In 
simple words, a covert channel is a 
communication channel that can be exploited by 
a process to transfer information in a manner 
that violates a system’s security policy [4].
2. Classification of Covert Channels
Covert channels can classified into two 
categories 
 Covert Storage Channel
 Covert Timing Channel
2.1 Covert Storage Channels
A potential covert channel is a storage channel if 
its scenario of use "involves the direct or indirect 
writing of a storage location by one process and 
the direct or indirect reading of the storage 
location by another process" [5]. Storage 
channels use memory locations, such as object 
attributes, its existence and shared resources, for 
transmission [6].
2.1.1 Classification of Covert Storage 
channels
Storage channels mainly manipulate two 
aspects of information to embed covert data.
 Entity Attributes: File names can be used 
for storage channels [6]. It can be changed 
by one process. A message transfer between 
the processes occurs when a read operation 
performed by any other process. File 
attributes, which contains properties about a 
file, can also be manipulated. Even if we are 
asking for a file which does not exist, the 
feedback status returned by file system can 
be used for storage channels.
 Shared Resources: Such resources as disk 
blocks, physical memory, I/O buffers, 
allocated I/O devices, and various queues 
for shared devices, such as printers and 
plotters, can be used as storage channels [6].
2.1.2 Prevention against Storage channels
 Mandatory Access Controls: Usage of 
mandatory access controls that cannot be 
directly or indirectly bypassed [6].
Whenever a subject attempts to access an 
object, an authorization rule enforced by the 
operating system kernel examines these 
security attributes and decides whether the 
access can take place. Any operation by any 
subject on any object will be tested against 
the set of authorization rules (aka policy) to 
determine if the operation is allowed. This 
will allow the system to assign special 
security attributes which cannot be changed 
on request as other attributes can.
 Shared Resource Overflow: In order to 
minimize any shared resource from being 
able to fill the resource queue, a per-process 
quota can be used [6]. The main problem 
with this method is that the resources are no 
longer shared between processes.  
2.2 Timing Channels
A potential covert channel is a timing channel if 
its scenario of use involves a process that 
"signals information to another by modulating 
its own use of system resources (e.g., CPU time) 
in such a way that this manipulation affects the 
real response time observed by the second 
process." [5]
2.2.1 Classification of Timing channels
Based on the source of the network connection 
that is used, Timing channels can be classified 
as:
• Passive: Timing channels that use an existing 
connection established by the user to transfer 
covert data. Their capacity to transfer is limited 
by the throughput of the base connection. As 
passive timing channels do not create any 
additional network connections, they are less 
prone to detection.
• Active: Timing channels that spawn a separate 
connection to transfer covert data. They are 
capable of achieving significantly higher 
throughput as compared to passive timing 
channels. As the attacker has to create his own 
connection they are more prone to detection.
2.2.2 Defenses against Timing Channels
Defenses against timing channels can be 
classified as Prevention-based and Detection-
based.
 Prevention Based: The primary goal of 
prevention-based defenses is to eliminate the 
possibility of timing channels or make it 
impractical to establish a timing channel. 
The working of timing channel depends on 
timing information; therefore, prevention-
based defenses erode these properties of a 
channel by distorting the timing of traffic 
streams. 
 Detection Based: In case of Detection, 
anomalies in statistical properties of network 
traffic are used to differentiate covert traffic 
from legitimate traffic. The most commonly 
used statistical properties are shape and 
regularity. In general, passive timing 
channels are more prone to shape detection 
as they add delay in legitimate streams. 
They almost follow the same recurrence of 
patterns as in legitimate traffic and are not 
prone to regularity tests. On the other hand, 
since active timing channels generate traffic, 
they can easily maintain the shape of the 
distribution and are less prone to shape 
detection test. However, they cannot 
maintain the recurrence of patterns and are 
easily detectable by regularity test.
3. Evaluation Criteria
We use three main criteria for evaluating covert 
channels in network protocols.
 Capacity determines the maximum error-
free transmission rate of a covert channel 
[7]. Capacity is typically measured in bits 
per second, but for network covert channels 
it can also be expressed in bits per overt 
packet.[8]
 Robustness determines how easily a covert 
channel is eliminated or its capacity is 
limited by channel noise.[8]
 Stealth determines how easily a covert 
channel can be detected by comparing the 
characteristics of traffic with covert channel 
and unmodified legitimate traffic.[8]
4. Effect of Noise
As with any communication channel, covert 
channels can be noisy or noiseless. A channel is 
said to be noiseless if the symbols transmitted by 
the sender are the same as those received by the 
receiver with probability 1. With covert 
channels, each symbol is usually represented by 
one bit and, therefore, a covert channel is 
noiseless if any bit transmitted by a sender is 
decoded correctly by the receiver with 
probability 1. Noise increases the error rates in a 
communication channel. The capacity of a 
channel is its maximum possible error-free 
information rate in bits per second. By using 
error-correcting codes, one can substantially 
reduce the error rates of noisy channels [9].
5. Temperature based Covert Channels
Temperature based covert channel is an example 
of an advance covert channel. It is noisy indirect 
timing channels that transmit covert data via 
changes of temperature (referred to as 
temperature-based covert channels), exploiting 
the fact that a host’s CPU temperature depends 
on the number of service requests processed per 
time unit and the skew of a host’s system clock 
depends on the temperature. Clock skew 
changes can be estimated remotely from a series 
of a clock’s timestamps [8].It is not possible to 
directly measure a remote host’s true clock 
skew. However, the attacker can measure the 
offset between the target’s clock and a local 
clock, and then estimate the relative clock skew. 
For a packet i, containing a timestamp of the 
target’s clock received by the attacker, the offset 
õi is [10]:
Where t˜ i is the estimated time at the 
intermediate, tri is the local time the packet was 
received, sc is the constant clock-skew 
component, the integral over s (t) is the variable 
clock skew component, ci/h is the quantization 
noise for random sampling and di is the network 
delay.
Temperature-based channels could possibly be 
used for general-purpose covert 
communications, even in scenarios where most 
other simpler covert channels are not available, 
because it is difficult to eliminate them 
completely [10]. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented an overview of 
covert channels, their classification, and 
methods for preventing them which will help the 
beginners to understand it. We have briefly 
discussed effect of noise in covert channels. We 
also explored covert channel based on 
temperature. 
References:
[1] B. W. Lampson, "A Note on the Confinement 
Problem," Communications of the ACM, 16:10, 
pp. 613-615, October 1973
[2] M. Schaefer, B. Gold, R. Linde, and J. 
Scheid, "Program Confinement in KVM/370" 
Proceedings of the 1977 Annual ACM 
Conference, Seattle, Washington, ACM, New 
York, pp. 404-410, October 1977
[3] R. A. Kemmerer, "Shared Resource Matrix 
Methodology: An Approach to Identifying 
Storage and Timing Channels" ACM 
Transactions on Computer Systems, 1:3, pp. 
256-277, August 1983
[4] Steven Gianvecchio, Haining Wang, 
Duminda Wijesekera, and Sushil Jajodia. Model-
Based Covert Timing Channels: Automated 
Modeling and Evasion. In RAID ’08: 
Proceedings of the 11th international symposium 
on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 
pages 211–230, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. 
Springer-Verlag
[5] NCSC-TG-030, Covert Channel Analysis of 
Trusted Systems (Light Pink Book) from 
the United States Department of 
Defense (DoD) Rainbow Series publications.
[6] M. Gasser. Building a secure computer 
system, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 
1988.
[7] T. M. Cover, J. A. Thomas. Elements of 
Information Theory. Wiley Series in 
Telecommunications. John Wiley & Sons, 1991
[8] Sebastian Zander, Performance of Selected 
Noisy Covert Channels and Their 
Countermeasures in IP Networks, thesis 
submitted at Swinburne University of 
Technology, Melbourne.
[9] R. G. Gallager, Information Theory and 
Reliable Communications, John Wiley and Sons, 
New York, 1968
[10] S. J. Murdoch. Hot or Not: Revealing 
Hidden Services by Their Clock Skew. In 
Proceedings of 13th ACM Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 
pages 27–36, November 2006
